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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the denial of post -conviction relief. Post -conviction relief should
have been granted because Earl Steele's state and federal constitutional due process rights were
violated by his conviction upon a plea which was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and
because he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel
when counsel failed to advise Mr. Steele of the consequences of entering an Alford! plea in a sex
offense case. Idaho Constitution, Art. 1, § 13, United States Constitution, Amendments 5, 6 and
14.
B. Procedural History
In 2008, Mr. Steele was charged with three counts of lewd conduct and one count of
sexual abuse of a minor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he entered an Alford plea to a single
count of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen Years, I.C. § 18-1506, and all
other charges were dismissed. Without objection by trial counsel, he was given an illegal
sentence of 25 years, with seven fixed. (At the time of the alleged offenses, the maximum
penalty was 15 years.) R 173-4.
Mr. Steele appealed and the illegal sentence was affirmed in an unpublished decision on
the basis that the Court of Appeals will not consider a claim that a sentence is illegal for the first
time on appeal. State v. Steele, No. 35306, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 648, October 22,
2009.
Mr. Steele then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and counsel was
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North Carolina v. A((ord, 400 U.S. 25, 9 I S.Ct. 160 (1970).

appointed. R 4-17,23.
In the meantime, the District Court granted a Rule 35 motion to correct the illegal
sentence and resentenced Mr. Steele to 15 years with 7 fixed. R 173-4.
Ultimately, a second amended petition, drafted by Mr. Steele, but submitted by counsel,
was filed. R 131-171, Tr.p.l05,ln.II-18.
Mr. Steele's petition raises two grounds for relief: 1) that the A (ford plea was not
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered because counsel did not inform Mr. Steele of the
sentencing and parole consequences of maintaining factual innocence in a sex offense case and
because counsel had informed him that he would be given a rider; and 2) that counsel was
ineffective in advising Mr. Steele to enter an Alford plea and submit to a psychosexual evaluation
for purposes of sentencing while maintaining factual innocence. R 132-136.
In pleading his first grounds for relief, Mr. Steele made clear that he was asserting both
that his plea was obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process because it was
not voluntary, knowing and intelligent and that his plea was obtained in violation of the
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. R 132-135. As he averred in his
petition:
9. Petitioner alleges that his guilty plea was involuntarily, unintelligently, and
unknowingly entered. Counsel coerced Petitioner to accept an Alford plea with
false and omitted advice.
R 132.
26. Petitioner by this application asserts ineffective assistance of Counsel, and if
proven true, establishes an abridgement of a constitutional right and deemed a
manifest injustice. Therefore Petitioner request[ s] this' manifest injustice' be
corrected, and be allowed to withdraw his Alford plea.
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R 135.
Mr. Steele also aveITed that counsel failed to inform him that an Alford pIca would be
viewed by the Department of COITections as indicative of being in a state of denial and result in
ineligibility for parole. R 133.
With regard to the second grounds for relief, that counsel's representation in connection
with the Alford plea and the psychosexual evaluation was ineffective, Mr. Steele aveITed that
counsel's performance was ineffective under both the state and federal constitutions. Mr. Steele
aveITed that because of his maintenance of a claim of factual innocence, he was found to be a
high risk to reoffend and to have anti-social personality disorder and lack the "empathy gene."
R 135-6.
Mr. Steele also averred that but for counsel's deficient performance, he would not have
entered a plea, but would have proceeded to trial. R 134.
Mr. Steele supported his second amended petition with his own affidavit, a copy of the
guilty plea advisory and the transcripts from the guilty plea and sentencing hearings. R 13 8-163.
The prosecutor's argument at sentencing supports Mr. Steele's allegations that his
assertion of factual innocence resulted in a very negative psychosexual evaluation which resulted
in a harsher sentence than would otherwise have been imposed. The prosecutor first referenced
the fact that, according to the psychosexual evaluation, Mr. Steele had no empathy gene. She
then argued that, according to the evaluation, Mr. Steele was in such denial that he could not be
rehabilitated in any setting. R 160 (Tr. p. 22, In. 4-19).
He's not a good candidate for outpatient. And Dr. Johnson even goes further. He
is not even a good candidate in a structured environment. I mean, that's what he
writes in his report. I haven't seen that many times.
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Not only does he need to work on his alcoholism issues first, but he's not a good
candidate to even be in the prison doing sex offender treatment because he is in
such denial at this point.
R.160(Tr.p.23,ln.16-2S).
The Court's statements at sentencing also support Mr. Steele's allegations that the
assertion of factual innocence resulted in a negative psychosexual evaluation and ultimately in a
harsher sentence:
The most problematic of all of this is the fact that you simply are not accepting
responsibility for your conduct. And in the SANE evaluation you didn't see how
it harmed your daughter and the other victim in this case.
And your failure to accept responsibility and just to come in and say, yeah, I know
what I did, it was wrong continues and in my opinion continues to victimize your
daughter by that kind of attitude as well as the other victim in this case.
The SANE evaluation indicates that you have a very high - or [high] risk to
reoffend, that you are [not] amenable to community-based sex offender treatment.
Probation is not an option in this case ....
R 162-3, Tr. p. 31, In. 11 - p. 32, In. 1.
The state objected to the filing of the second amended post-conviction petition. Tr. p. 26,
In. 16. The District Court noted the state's objection, but then made clear to the state and Mr.
Steele that the second amended petition would completely take the place of all prior petitions.
Tr. p. 31, In. 4-6; p. 36, In. 13-14. And, the prosecutor and the court specifically noted that the
state could file a new answer to the amended petition. Tr. p. 32, In. 18-19; p. 34, In. 1-3. The
court further ruled that the state's prior answer and motion for summary judgment were now
moot. Tr. p. 38, In. 23 - p. 39, In. 7. However, the state never filed an answer. ROA.
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Steele and trial counsel testified.
Of import to the claim that the plea was constitutionally invalid because it was not
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voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered, Mr. Steele repeatedly testified that counsel had
advised him that by entering an Alford plea he would get a rider and probation. See, for example,
Tr. 49, In. 3-8; p. 51, In. 1-2; p. 53, In. 2-4. He also testified that he would not have entered an

Alford plea had he known the impact his assertion of factual innocence would have on the
psychosexual evaluation, his sentence and the ultimate term of the sentence that would be served.
Tr. p. 62, In. 12-17; p. 90, In. 3-7; p. 96, In. 20-97, In. 3. The state never rebutted this testimony.
Of import to the claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective in his advice to Mr.
Steele to enter the Alford plea without advising him of the consequences for the evaluation and
sentencing and in having Mr. Steele participate in a psychosexual evaluation for use at
sentencing, trial counsel testified as to all his contact with Mr. Steele as evidenced by his case
diary. Tr. p. 120, In. 14-155, In. 16. None of counsel's recollections included any advice to Mr.
Steele regarding the impact of an Alford plea with its assertion of factual innocence on his
psychosexual evaluation or the sentence. Id In fact, counsel offered a narrative about why he
believed there was no danger in entering an Alford plea and then submitting to a psychosexual
evaluation. Counsel's narrative went to his general belief that there was no "tension" in advising
a client to enter an Alford plea and then go to a psychosexual evaluation. However, counsel also
testified he was surprised when Mr. Steele's evaluation rated him at a high risk ofreoffense
because counsel thought he was not a high risk and that medium would have been more
appropriate. Tr. p. 161, p. 1 - p. 163, In. l. Counsel never testified that he had even mentioned
to Mr. Steele anything at all about how a claim of factual innocence would affect his
psychosexual evaluation or sentence. Tr. p. 106, In. 1 - p. 163, In. 1. Rather, counsel testified
only that he had told Mr. Steele that he was not required to participate in the psychosexual
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evaluation but failing to participate might cause him to lose the benefit of the plea bargain. Tr. p.
146, In. 6-12.
The District Court denied post-conviction relief. With regard to the question of whether
Mr. Steele's plea comported with due process insofar as it was voluntary, knowing and
intelligent, the Court found that the evidence had indicated a valid plea and that Mr. Steele had
testified under oath that he understood the plea agreement and no other promises had been made
to him. R 177.
With regard to the allegation that counsel failed to advise Mr. Steele regarding the impact
of an Alford plea on his term of incarceration, the Court noted that it was Mr. Steele's choice to
not be rehabilitated and that it was disingenuous of Mr. Steele to suggest he did not understand
that rehabilitation is desired. R 179.
The Court rejected the claim that but for counsel's "delusive and omitted advice," Mr.
Steele would not have pled guilty, because the Court found Mr. Steele had not demonstrated that
the advice was "delusive and omitted." R 179.
With regard to the allegation that counsel was ineffective in relation to the Alford plea
and the psychosexual evaluation, the Court found that the evaluation was conducted by a neutral
professional and was a requirement of the plea agreement and provides much infonnation based
on Mr. Steele's history and testing. Further, the Court held there was no evidence that counsel
knew what the results of the evaluation would be when he allowed Mr. Steele to participate in it.
Thus, there was not ineffective assistance of counsel. R 179-80.
This appeal timely followed. R 182-184.
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Should post-conviction relief have been granted because the plea entered in ignorance

of the consequences violated the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process?
2. Should post-conviction relief have been granted because Mr. Steele was denied the
state and federal constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
In a post-conviction hearing, the applicant has the burden of proving the allegations
which entitle him or her to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Findings of fact will not be
set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Garzee v. State, 126 Idaho 396, 398, 883 P.2d 1088,
1090 (CLApp. 1994). Constitutional questions in a post-conviction case are pure questions of
law subject to free review. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149 P.3d 833, 836 (2006).

B. Post-Conviction Relief Should Have Been Granted Because a Plea
Entered in Ignorance of the Consequences Violates the Constitutional
Guarantee of Due Process
The failure to advise Mr. Steele in a sex offense case of the direct consequences of an
Alford plea on the penalty that would be imposed and ultimately served resulted in the entry of a

plea that was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent in violation of the state and federal
constitutional guarantees of due process. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and
14; McCarthy v. United Slates, 394 U.S. 459, 466,89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171 (1969). Because Mr.

Steele proved by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel did fail to advise him of the
consequences of his Alford plea, post-conviction relief should have been granted.
4901(1).
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I.e.

§ 19-

A defendant entering a guilty plea waives several constitutional rights, including the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right to
confrontation. For this waiver to be valid under the due process clauses of the state and federal
constitutions, it must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege. McCarthy, supra; Johnson v. Zerbsl, 304 U.S. 458, 464,58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938). If a
defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of
due process and is void. McCarthy, supra. A plea cannot be voluntary unless it is made with
proper advice and a full understanding of the consequences. Marchibroda v. United States, 368
U.S. 487,493,82 S.Ct. 510, 513 (1962); Von j\1oltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708,68 S.Ct. 316

(1948); Waleyv. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101,62 S.Ct. 964 (1942). See also, Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1496 (2010) (Scalia, 1. and Thomas, 1. dissenting, noting that counsel's
misadvice to defendant entering guilty plea regarding consequences of the plea may render the
plea involuntary under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). See also, State v. Colyer, 98
Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626,628 (1976) (for plea to be voluntary, defendant must understand the
consequences of pleading guilty); State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 156 P.3d 1193 (2006)
(possibility of requirement of payment of child support for victim's children was direct
consequence of plea and failure to inform defendant of that possibility amounted to manifest
injustice which permitted withdrawal of plea); State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 172 P.3d 1133
(Ct.App. 2007) (possibility that sentence will run consecutively to prior sentence is a direct
consequence of plea of which defendant must be informed to insure plea is constitutionally
valid).
Idaho distinguishes between direct and indirect consequences of a plea and holds that due
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process requires only that the defendant be informed of the direct consequences. Heredia, 144
Idaho at 97, 156 P.3d at 1197. Idaho looks to three factors to determine whether a consequence
is direct or indirect: 1) the defendant's power to prevent the consequence; 2) the punitive or
remedial nature of the consequence; and 3) the amount of control the sentencing judge has over
imposing the consequence. Id. The United States Supreme Court does not necessarily
distinguish between direct and collateral consequences, at least under a Sixth Amendment right
to counsel analysis. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481.
In this case, Mr. Steele alleged that no one informed him of the consequences of an
Alford plea to a sex offense in terms of impact on the psychosexual evaluation, the sentence

imposed and the sentence ultimately served.
Even though I.C. § 19-4906(a) requires an answer to be filed, the state never filed an
answer to the second amended petition. Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8(d), all the averments in
the pleading must be deemed to be true. Hall v. State, 126 Idaho 449, 451,885 P.2d 1165, 1167
(Ct.App. 1994) (allegations in an application for post-conviction relief must be deemed true until
those allegations are controverted by the state).
And, while conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are not sufficient to entitle
a petitioner to relief, Nielson v. State, 121 Idaho 779, 780, 828 P.2d 342, 343 (Ct.App. 1992), in
this case, Mr. Steele's allegations were substantiated by the records in the District Court and
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing.
Not only did the state not answer the amended petition and deny Mr. Steele's allegation
that counsel did not advise him of the consequences of an Alford plea, the state did not present
any evidence at the evidentiary hearing that Mr. Steele had been advised of these direct
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consequences of his plea.
Nor did the state controvert either through an answer or by evidence Mr. Steele's
allegations that entry of an Alford plea would define him as being in a state of denial and thereby
result in him serving the full unified term as opposed to the fixed or some lesser tenn. And, Mr.
Steele's allegations that his sentence was harsher and more of it would be served are supported
by the prosecutor's own arguments at sentencing, specifically that Mr. Steele's assertion of
factual innocence resulted in a psychosexual evaluation which stated he was not even a candidate
for treatment in prison. But, most importantly, Mr. Steele's allegations are supported by the
District Court's statements at sentencing that the most troubling aspect of his case was his failure
to admit factual guilt, that as a result of that failure he was evaluated to be a high risk for
reoffense, and this made him ineligible for probation and required a very long sentence (indeed a
sentence 10 years longer than the statutory maximum).

In this case, the consequence at issue is the consequence of a harsher sentence than would
be imposed and ultimately served if a straight -up guilty plea was entered instead of an Alford
plea and this is a direct consequence under the three-prong analysis of Heredia. First, the
defendant has no power to prevent the consequence. So long as an Alford plea is entered, the
defendant is asserting his innocence. There is no way to avoid this short of entering a different
plea, a straight-up guilty plea which would require an innocent defendant to commit perjury.
Second, the consequence, a harsher sentence is absolutely punitive. And, finally, the sentencing
judge has absolute control over imposing the consequence. See State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho at
98, 156 P.3d at 1196, holding that a direct consequence is involved where the judge has a large
amount of control over the consequence and the defendant has no power and the purpose of the
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consequence is punitive or remedial.
In addition, of course, Mr. Steele faced the other consequences of a poorer psychosexual
evaluation because of his assertion of innocence and a practical ineligibility for parole at the end
of his fixed tenn. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner's Dilemma: Consequences of

Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 Iowa L.Rev. 491, 519 (2008) (the available
quantitative and qualitative data support that a prisoner's acceptance ofresponsibility proves
vital to his prospects for an affirmative parole decision.); Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on

Innocence, Wis.L.Rev. 237, 282 (2006) ("It is not uncommon for a parole board to require an
admission of guilt before considering an inmate for release."); Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not

Taken: Why Criminal Defendants Should Avoid the Alford Plea, 68 Mo.L.Rev. 913, 932 (2003)·
(noting that many states "include consideration of the inmate's remorse or lack thereof for the
offense committed" in parole decisions.).
Because the consequence of the harsher sentence was a direct consequence, the failure to
inform Mr. Steele prior to entry of the Alford plea rendered his plea unconstitutional under Idaho
law. Heredia, supra.
Further, even if this Court finds that a harsher sentence is not a direct as opposed to a
collateral consequence of the plea, under federal law, the failure to inform Mr. Steele that an

Alford plea would result in a harsher sentence still rendered the plea constitutionally invalid. See,
Marchibroda, supra, "Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful
that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with
full understanding of the consequences." See also, Von Moltke supra, holding that a plea entered
as a result of en·oneous advice of federal officers and in the absence of counsel is not
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constitutionally valid; Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482, holding that the collateral consequences versus
direct consequences distinction is not well-suited to all analyses of whether a plea comports with
constitutional requirements. Whether deemed a direct consequence or not, the fact that Mr.
Steele entered his plea in ignorance of the fact that an Aljhrd plea in a sex offense case would
result in harsher punishment than would otherwise be imposed rendered the plea involuntary and
unconstitutional.
Mr. Steele established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was denied his state
and federal constitutional rights to due process in the entry ofthe Alford plea. Therefore, the
denial of post-conviction relief was improper.
C. Post-Conviction Relief Should Have Been Granted Because Mr. Steele
Was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel

Post-conviction relief should have been granted because, as discussed above, the plea was
not entered in a voluntary, knowing and intelligent manner as required by the due process clauses
of the state and federal constitutions.
In addition, post-conviction relief should have been granted because counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13, United States Constitution Amends. 6 and
14.
Before deciding to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771,90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970); Stricklandv.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686,104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,106
S.Ct. 366 (1985); Padilla, supra; Booth v. State, _

Idaho _,262 P.3d 256,261 (2011).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally governed by the two-part test of
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Strickland. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show that counsel's representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the deficiencies in counsel's
performance were prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 690, 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-7.
In a case involving a guilty plea, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether
counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Booth, supra, citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 376,386 (2004). As stated in
Booth, "The mere inaccuracy of a prediction regarding sentence will not give rise to a claim for

ineffective assistance, but a gross mischaracterization ofthe likely outcome, combined with
erroneous advice on the possible effects of going to trial, falls below the required level of
competence." Booth, quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 422.
In this case, Mr. Steele proved deficient performance because he demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that counsel did not advise him of the consequences on his
sentence of maintaining his innocence through an Alford plea. Counsel was not just merely
inaccurate in predicting the likely outcome. Counsel failed altogether to recognize and advise his
client that in a sex case maintaining one's innocence will lead to a poor psychosexual evaluation
and inevitability a harsher sentence than would otherwise be imposed. See, Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at
1483, holding that when the law is clear, a defense attorney has a duty to give the client correct
advice regarding the consequences ofthe plea and when the law is not succinct and
straightforward the attorney must advise that there is a possibility of an adverse consequence to
the plea.
Here, the law is clear that failure to take responsibility for a charged sex offense by
admitting guilt at the psychosexual evaluation and before the court will, in nearly every single
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case, result in a harsher sentence. See Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (Ct.App.
2006), failure to advise client of the Fifth Amendment right not to participate in a psychosexual
evaluation which may support a harsher sentence is deficient performance. See also, Medwed,
supra; Rosen, supra; and Ward, supra. Thus, counsel had an absolute duty to give Mr. Steele
correct advice that his denial of guilt would result in a greater sentence. Padilla, supra; Estrada,
supra.
However, even if this Court finds that the law is not succinct and straightforward, counsel
nonetheless was obliged to advise Mr. Steele there was a possibility of an adverse consequence
of his maintaining innocence through the use of an Alford plea. Padilla, supra; Booth, supra,
holding that "specifically a guilty plea is only valid where the plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent course among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Mr. Steele
could not have made a voluntary and intelligent decision of whether to go to trial, enter an Alford
plea, or enter a regular guilty plea when he was not informed that an Alford plea represented, in
many ways, the worse of the possible pleas because he would lose all the constitutional rights
associated with trial and be convicted and sentenced, but he would also not get the benefit in
sentencing and later parole decisions of having acknowledged his guilt and thus rendered himself
amenable to rehabilitation.
And, indeed, this is what happened. As a result of maintaining his innocence, Mr. Steel
received a psychosexual evaluation that was exceptionally negative, of a type not often seen by
the prosecutor, wherein it was concluded that he was not amenable to treatment in any setting
and a high risk to reoffend. The District Court specifically noted at sentencing that Mr. Steele's
failure to admit factual guilt was the most disturbing thing about the case and called for a harsher
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sentence than would otherwise be imposed.
Counsel's failure to advise Mr. Steele of the consequences of an Alford plea on the
psychosexual evaluation and sentencing was deficient performance. Moreover, the deficiency
was prejudicial.
To establish prejudice, Mr. Steele had to show a "reasonable probability that the outcome
would be different but for counsel's deficient performance." Booth, supra, citing McKay v.

State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at
2068. In a guilty plea case, this means the defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. Booth, supra, citing Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d
925,930 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59,106 S.Ct. at 370).
The focus in this inquiry is on the defendant's state of mind when choosing to plead
guilty and there is no requirement that the court speculate as to what sentence would have been
imposed if a not guilty plea had been entered and the matter proceeded to trial and conviction.

Booth, supra. Specifically, courts have looked to whether the petitioner has alleged that but for
counsel's deficient advice, he would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to
trial. See Booth, supra. See also, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 60,106 S.Ct. at 371.
In this case, Mr. Steele specifically alleged that "but for Counsel's delusive and omitted
advice, he would not have plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." R 134. And,
the state never rebutted this allegation. Moreover, the District Court never rejected it. Rather,
the District Court held that this allegation was of no import because the Court did not believe
counsel's advice was deficient. R 179.
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Mr. Steele's allegation that he would not have pled guilty had he been advised about the
consequences of an Alj(Jl-d plea on his psychosexual evaluation and sentence establishes
prejudice.
As Mr. Steele demonstrated both deficient performance and prejUdice, the denial of postconviction relief was improper.

V. CONCLUSION
Post-conviction relief should have been granted both because the plea was taken in
violation of the state and federal constitutional rights to due process and because it was taken in
violation of the state and federal constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel. Mr.
Steele respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying relief, grant the petition, and
remand for further proceedings in accord with the relief granted.
I]

.;t.,(

Submitted this~ofNovember, 2011.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Earl Steele
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